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OPINION OF THE COURT  
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This case concerns a trademark that once enjoyed 
widespread recognition but has since grown considerably 
weaker.  Since the 1950s, Parks Sausage Company has 
manufactured or licensed sausage under the brand name 
“PARKS.”1  At one point, PARKS was placed on the 
Principal Register of trademarks at the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), but, sometime in the early 
2000s, Parks failed to renew the registration.  In 2014, Tyson 
Foods, Inc. and Hillshire Brands Company (collectively, 
“Tyson”),2 the owners of the frankfurter brand BALL PARK, 
launched a premium frankfurter product called PARK’S 
                                              
1 We use “Parks” in lowercase letters to refer to the 
company and “PARKS” in capital letters to refer to the mark.   
 
2 Hillshire Farms was acquired by Tyson in 2014 and 
remains a wholly owned subsidiary.  Parks, LLC v. Tyson 
Foods, Inc., Civ. No. 5:15-00946, 2015 WL 4545408, at *1 
(E.D. Pa. July 28, 2015).   
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FINEST.  Parks sued, arguing that Tyson was engaged in 
false advertising and was infringing Parks’s trademark.   
 
 The District Court determined that Parks’s claim for 
false advertising was really a repetition of its trademark 
claim, and that the PARKS mark was too weak to merit 
protection against Tyson’s use of the PARK’S FINEST name.  
We agree with the District Court and will affirm in all 
respects.   
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
A.  Parks and PARKS 
 
Parks was founded in the 1950s by Henry G. Parks, Jr., 
a pioneering African-American businessman.  The company 
had the distinction at one point of being the first African-
American-owned company to be publicly traded on the New 
York Stock Exchange.  Parks engaged in radio and television 
advertising directed to consumers and developed a well-
known slogan, “More Parks Sausages, Mom, Please[.]”  
(Opening Br. at 29.)  Though the PARKS brand had likely 
developed prominence sufficient for common law trademark 
protection earlier than 1970, the name was not registered at 
the USPTO until that year.   
 
Following the death of Mr. Parks in 1989, the 
company he built fell on hard times.  It eventually went 
bankrupt and was purchased by its current owners.  Parks 
stopped making and selling PARKS products and instead 
entered into a licensing agreement in 2000 with Dietz & 
Watson, a Philadelphia-based producer of delicatessen meats, 
to make and sell PARKS-branded products.  Around that 
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time, the USPTO registration of the mark lapsed.  In 2002, 
Parks also granted a license to Super Bakery, Inc., a supplier 
of baked goods that is related to Parks by common ownership, 
to sell PARKS-branded products in military commissaries.  
At least since the licensing agreement with Dietz & Watson 
17 years ago, PARKS-branded products have been advertised 
primarily through grocery store handbills and circulars rather 
than through television and radio advertising.   
 
 From 2008 through 2014, Dietz & Watson sold over 
$38 million worth of PARKS-branded products.  In 2014, 
PARKS sales through Dietz & Watson increased 40% from 
the previous year.  In addition, from 2003 through August 
2013, Super Bakery sold some $31 million in PARKS 
products. 
 
 B.  Tyson, BALL PARK, and PARK’S FINEST 
 
BALL PARK brand frankfurters are well known, 
accounting for 23% of the revenue of all franks sold in the 
United States.3  Parks, LLC v. Tyson Foods, Inc., Civ. No. 
5:15-00946, 2015 WL 4545408, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 
2015).  Tyson owns the BALL PARK mark and claims that 
the brand is recognized by 90% of American adults over the 
age of eighteen.  Id.  In 2014, Tyson introduced a line of 
“super-premium” frankfurters that it decided to call 
“[PARK’S FINEST].”  Parks, LLC v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 186 
F. Supp. 3d. 405, 412 (E.D. Pa. 2016).  It says it chose that 
                                              
3 Though it may distress the cognoscenti, we use the 
terms “frankfurters,” “franks,” and “hot dogs,” as synonyms.  
Not so with the term “sausage,” which we use to denote 
something akin to but arguably different from hot dogs. 
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name after conducting extensive consumer research.  
According to Tyson, surveys showed that the name “conveys 
premium quality in a clever, memorable way that should be 
ownable for the [BALL PARK] brand.”  (App. at 375.)  
 
Packaging for the frankfurters includes the BALL 
PARK logo superimposed over the words PARK’S FINEST.   
 
 
 
(App. at 11.)  Tyson says that it designed the packaging to 
“strongly convey[]” the BALL PARK mark so that 
consumers would make the connection between BALL PARK 
and the PARK’S FINEST product.  (App. at 390.)  In 
advertisements, the product would be referred to as 
“[PARK’S FINEST] from [BALL PARK],” Parks, 2015 WL 
4545408 at *2, or sometimes “BALL PARK’S FINEST.”  
(Opening Br. at 17.)  Before the product was launched, 
Tyson’s attorneys undertook a trademark search, discovered 
the lapsed PARKS mark, and confirmed the cancellation of 
the mark with the USPTO.   
 7 
C.  Procedural Background 
 
 Parks filed suit against Tyson in 2015, asserting false 
advertising, false association, and trademark dilution claims 
under the Lanham Act, as well as Pennsylvania common law 
and statutory claims.4  It requested a nationwide injunction 
and an accounting of the sales of PARK’S FINEST franks.   
 
 The District Court denied Parks’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction because it concluded that Parks was 
unlikely to succeed on the merits of its false advertising 
claim.  Parks, 2015 WL 4545408 at *16.  Once discovery 
ended, Tyson moved for summary judgment on all of Parks’s 
claims.  Parks conceded that its trademark dilution claim and 
its state law claims should be dismissed, and they were.  The 
Court then granted summary judgment on the remaining 
Lanham Act claims of false association and false advertising, 
concluding that “no reasonable factfinder could find in 
                                              
4 Specifically, Parks’s claims were: (1) false 
advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a)(1)(B); (2) trademark infringement in the eastern 
United States (all states east of the Mississippi river) under 
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A); (3) trademark 
dilution under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); (4) 
trademark infringement under Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection Act, 54 Pa. Const. Stat. 
§ 1123, although Parks confusingly says in the body of Count 
4 that it is “under common law”; (5) trademark dilution under 
Pennsylvania statutory law, 54 Pa. Const. Stat. § 1124; and 
(6) unfair competition under Pennsylvania common law.   
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Parks’s favor[.]”  Parks, 186 F. Supp. 3d. at 413 (footnote 
omitted).  Parks timely appealed.   
 
II.  DISCUSSION5  
 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(a), creates “two distinct bases of liability: false 
association … and false advertising.”  Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. 
Static Control Components, Inc., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 
1384 (2014); see also J. Thomas McCarthy, 5 McCarthy on 
Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 27:9 (4th ed. 2017) 
[hereinafter “McCarthy on Trademarks”] (describing “two 
major and distinct types” of claims under § 1125(a)).  Section 
1125(a)(1)(A) prohibits “false or misleading” claims that are 
“likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive 
as to … the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her 
goods, services, or commercial activities by another 
person[.]”  That provision is “the foremost federal vehicle for 
the assertion of … infringement of … unregistered marks, 
                                              
5 The District Court had jurisdiction over the Lanham 
Act claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the state law claims 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  Summary judgment is appropriate only if 
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a).  A dispute is genuine when “the evidence is 
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 248 (1986).  
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names and trade dress[.]”6  5 McCarthy on Trademarks 
§ 27:9.  Claims made under it are often called “false 
designation of origin” or “false association” claims.  Id. at n. 
1.05.  We will use the latter term here.  To establish a false 
association claim, the owner of an unregistered mark “has the 
burden ... of proving the existence of a protectable mark.”  
E.T. Browne Drug Co. v. Cococare Prod., Inc., 538 F.3d 185, 
191 (3d Cir. 2008).  When, as in this case, the mark is a 
surname, a necessary step in showing that it is eligible for 
protection as a trademark is demonstrating that it has acquired 
secondary meaning.  Id. at 191-92.  “Secondary meaning” is a 
term of art in trademark law that refers to “a mental 
association in buyers’ minds between the alleged mark and a 
single source of the product.”  2 McCarthy on Trademarks 
§ 15:5. 
 
Another portion of the statute, subsection (a)(1)(B), 
forbids “commercial advertising or promotion” that 
“misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or 
geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, 
services, or commercial activities[.]”  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a)(1)(B).  Claims under that provision are called 
“false advertising” claims.  5 McCarthy on Trademarks 
§ 27:9.  False advertising claims do not require proof of 
secondary meaning, so litigants may be tempted to frame a 
false association claim as a false advertising claim, to ease 
their evidentiary burden.  Cf. Pernod Ricard USA, LLC v. 
Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 653 F.3d 241, 247 & n.8 (3d Cir. 2011) 
                                              
 6 For trademarks that are on the Principal Register at 
the USPTO, as the PARKS mark once was, section 32 of the 
Lanham Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1114, also provides a 
cause of action for infringement. 
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(noting that, in that case, the “false advertising dispute [was] 
a proxy for the real fight the parties want[ed] to have, which 
[was] over the right to the …use of … a trademark” and 
observing that “[t]his [was] not the first time the false 
advertising provision of the Lanham Act has been asked to 
stand in for a trademark action”).  That is what seems to have 
happened here, and we take this opportunity to clarify the 
distinction between claims brought under § 1125(a)(1)(A) and 
§ 1125(a)(1)(B).  As the District Court recognized, Parks’s 
false advertising claim fails because it is essentially a false 
association claim in disguise.  The false association claim is 
also infirm, for the reasons described by the District Court.  
 
A.  False Advertising  
 
As noted above, the statement at issue in a false 
advertising claim must “misrepresent[] the nature, 
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin” of a product.7  
                                              
7 Broadly stated, the elements a false advertising claim 
are:  
 
1) that the defendant has made false or 
misleading statements as to his own product [or 
another’s]; 2) that there is actual deception or at 
least a tendency to deceive a substantial portion 
of the intended audience; 3) that the deception 
is material in that it is likely to influence 
purchasing decisions; 4) that the advertised 
goods traveled in interstate commerce; and 5) 
that there is a likelihood of injury to the plaintiff 
in terms of declining sales, loss of good will, 
etc. 
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15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B); see Kehoe Component Sales Inc. 
v. Best Lighting Prods., Inc., 796 F.3d 576, 590 (6th Cir. 
2015) (“Absent a false statement about geographic origin, a 
misrepresentation is actionable under § 1125(a)(1)(B) only if 
it misrepresents the characteristics of the good itself– such as 
its properties or capabilities.  The statute does not encompass 
misrepresentations about the source of the ideas embodied in 
the object (such as a false designation of authorship)[.]” 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).  Parks’s false 
advertising claim fails because it depends upon the purported 
false association between Tyson’s PARK’S FINEST brand 
and the PARKS mark.  So the false advertising claim rises 
and falls with the false association claim, which we will 
subsequently address.  For now, we note simply that the 
primary argument Parks advances is that the name PARK’S 
FINEST falsely implies that Tyson’s product is one of Parks’s 
products.  As Parks puts it, Tyson marketed PARK’S FINEST 
as “Parks’ sausages.”  (Opening Br. at 21.)  In other words, 
PARK’S FINEST is only misleading in the way that Parks 
suggests if a consumer makes the connection between 
PARK’S FINEST and PARKS and has in mind a pre-existing 
association between PARKS and high quality products.  This 
is a false association claim and nothing more.   
 
Parks also argues that PARK’S FINEST is misleading 
with respect to the “nature, characteristics, [or] qualities,” 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B), of the product.  Parks alleges that the 
name PARK’S FINEST will imply to consumers that it is a 
sausage when in reality it is a frankfurter – an item consumers 
                                                                                                     
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Breathasure, Inc., 204 F.3d 87, 91-92 
(3d Cir. 2000).  The specific point at issue in this case bears 
on the first element.   
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may see as inferior.  Again, that contention largely duplicates 
the one that we have already found wanting.  Unless a 
consumer knows that PARKS is a mark for sausages, the 
name PARK’S FINEST does not carry any such implications.  
At bottom, then, this too is a false association claim.8    
 
To the extent that Parks is advancing the related 
argument that the name “PARK’S FINEST” is misleading 
because it blurs the distinction between frankfurters and 
sausages and is therefore confusing to consumers, that 
argument falters on two grounds.9  First of all, because the 
packaging for PARK’S FINEST displays “a factually 
accurate, unambiguous statement” that the product is a 
frankfurter, “[n]o reasonable consumer could be misled by 
those statements, and the rest of the label does not put those 
statements in doubt.”  See Pernod Ricard, 653 F.3d at 252 
(reaching the same conclusion with regards to a rum called 
Havana Club that was actually made in Puerto Rico but 
                                              
8 The name PARK’S FINEST does touch upon the 
“nature, characteristics, [or] qualities,” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a)(1)(B), of the product in at least one respect.  It 
implies high quality.  But Parks does not allege that PARK’S 
FINEST is of poor quality or does not in fact deserve the 
positive appellation of “finest.”  Indeed, such a claim would 
likely fail since calling a product the finest is “common 
marketplace puffery,”  Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 
939, 945 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
  
9 It isn’t entirely clear whether Parks is actually 
making such an argument, but we address it for the sake of 
completeness.  
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informed consumers on the packaging that it was made in 
Puerto Rico).10  Second, Parks has undercut its own argument 
by repeatedly saying both at the District Court and before us 
on appeal that hot dogs and sausages are actually not 
distinctive.11  If a frankfurter is a kind of a sausage, as Parks 
                                              
10 Parks points to evidence in the record suggesting 
that Tyson may have hoped to create a cross-over product that 
would appeal to both sausage and frankfurter consumers.  For 
instance, focus groups sessions conducted before launch 
suggested that PARK’S FINEST was seen “as a satisfying 
sausage in a convenient, fully-cooked, smaller link.”  (App. at 
788 (emphasis omitted).)  However, as the District Court 
noted “[a] consumer who encounters the [PARK’S FINEST] 
product would not be privy to how [Tyson] intended for the 
product to be seen” and would be exposed to the 
unambiguously true statement that the product contains 
“uncured beef frankfurters.”  Parks, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 416 
n.2. 
 
11 For instance, Parks notes that some dictionaries 
define a “hot dog” as “a small cooked sausage,” (Opening Br. 
at 22 (quoting hot dog, Merriam-Webtster’s Online 
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/hot%20dog (last visited on May 1, 
2017))), and frankfurter as “a cured cooked sausage[.]” 
(Opening Br. at 22 (quoting frankfurter, Merriam-Webtster’s 
Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/frankfurter (last visited on May 1, 
2017)).)  Parks also points out that hot dogs and sausages are 
grouped in the same category under the Nice Classification 
system, an international classification system for the 
registration of trademarks, and that Parks’s food marketing 
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suggests, then there is nothing false or misleading if the 
advertising for PARK’S FINEST suggests that to consumers.   
 
Parks’s final argument is that the name PARK’S 
FINEST is misleading with regard to “origin.”  (Opening Br. 
at 15-16.)  To a large extent that argument falters because it 
repeats the same mistakes we have already discussed.  But it 
also fails for another reason. Section 1125(a)(1)(B) focuses 
specifically on statements that are false with regard to 
“geographic origin” and not other types of “false 
designation[s] of origin,” § 1125(a)(1).12  So, § 1125(a)(1)(B) 
can be the proper vehicle for bringing a challenge to, for 
example, a Swiss army knife not made in Switzerland, Black 
Hills gold jewelry that is not made in the Black Hills, or 
Scotch whiskey not manufactured in Scotland.  Cf. Forschner 
Grp., Inc. v. Arrow Trading Co. Inc., 30 F.3d 348, 355 (2d 
Cir. 1994) (concluding that the term “swiss” in swiss army 
                                                                                                     
expert testified that “the food industry considers and treats hot 
dogs and sausages as one category.”  (Opening Br. at 22; 
App. at 633-34.)   
 
12 Prior to 1989, § 43(a) of the Lanham Act did not 
clearly distinguish between false association and false 
advertising claims and merely prohibited “false designation[s] 
of origin” generally.  Lanham Act, Pub L. No. 79-489, § 43, 
60 Stat. 427, 441 (1946); see also 5 McCarthy on Trademarks 
§§ 27:6, 27:7 (describing the history of § 43(a)).  In 1989, the 
statute was amended by creating separate subsections 
covering false association and false advertising, and by 
adding the modifier “geographic” before “origin” in the false 
advertising subsection.  15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(B); 5 
McCarthy on Trademarks §§ 27:6, 27:7. 
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knife was not a geographic term of origin but adjudicating the 
claim under § 1125(a)(1)(B)); Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. 
Gold Rush, Inc., 633 F.2d 746, 750 (8th Cir. 1980) (noting 
that the Lanham Act’s prohibition on false advertising 
“continue[s] [a] tradition of providing protection against 
outsiders who use the same geographical designation”); 
Scotch Whiskey Ass’n v. Barton Distilling Co., 489 F.2d 809, 
811 (7th Cir. 1973) (applying an earlier version of the 
Lanham Act to resolve a geographic origin claim).  But that 
subsection is not the right vehicle for addressing claims of 
false designation of origin that are not concerned specifically 
with geographic origin.  See Pernod Ricard, 653 F.3d at 250 
n.11 (noting that the most natural meaning of “geographic 
origin” would extend only to “the place of a product’s 
manufacture, not a broad inquiry into the product’s 
background,” but affirming dismissal on alternative grounds).  
We have suggested as much before in dicta, but never in a 
holding.  Id.  The question is now squarely before us and we 
conclude that the term “geographic origin” refers solely to the 
place of origin and not to the creator, manufacturer, or any 
broader conception of the term “origin.”13   
                                              
13 We leave for another day the question of how 
precisely the claimed geographic origin must match the actual 
place of origin.  We do not need to decide, for instance, 
whether a company headquartered in a particular place can 
truthfully label a product as coming from that location even 
though the product was manufactured elsewhere.  In Re 
Nantucket Allserve Inc., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1144 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 
11, 1993) (refusing to register the mark NANTUCKET 
NECTARS when the company was headquartered in 
Nantucket but the product was manufactured in Worcester, 
MA); but see In Re Joint-Stock Co. Baik, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1305 
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That conclusion is consistent with precedent from 
other circuit courts.  See Forschner Grp., 30 F.3d at 355 
(“The question is whether [the mark] can be construed to 
mean that the product is made in a certain locale.”); cf. Black 
Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co., 633 F.2d at 750  (noting that the 
Lanham Act follows the common law “tradition of providing 
protection against outsiders who use … [a] geographical 
designation”).  It is also consistent with Supreme Court 
precedent interpreting the term “origin of goods” in the 
context of a false association claim under the Lanham Act.  In 
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 37 
(2003), the Court emphasized that “origin” could refer to 
either “geographic origin” or “to origin of source or 
manufacture” but rejected the argument that the term origin 
could “be stretched” to include broader concepts of origin 
such as “the creator of the underlying work,” id. at 29-33, or 
“the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied 
in those goods,”  id. at 37.  So the term “origin” has already 
been cabined.   
 
Moreover, as we suggested in Pernod Ricard, the term 
is further narrowed in § 1125(a)(1)(B) by the addition of the 
modifier “geographic.”  Pernod Ricard, 653 F.3d at 250 n.11 
(questioning the district court’s effort to “use the modifier 
                                                                                                     
(T.T.A.B. June 8, 2006) (registering a trademark for 
BAIKALSKAYA VODKA manufactured in a town near 
Lake Baikal and using some water from the Lake in the 
manufacturing process).  Nor do we need to resolve a case 
like Pernod Ricard, in which the product in question had once 
been manufactured in Havana but was no longer.  Pernod 
Ricard, 653 F.3d at 244. 
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‘geographic’ to expand the meaning of ‘origin’ into the realm 
of history, heritage, and culture”).  Dictionary definitions of 
the term “geographic” are consistent with a focus on the place 
of origin or manufacture.  See Geographic, Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary 948 (1986) (defining 
“geographic” as “belonging to or characteristic of a particular 
region”).  Likewise, under the common law of trademarks, a 
“geographically descriptive trademark” is one that uses “a 
geographic name to indicate where the goods are grown or 
manufactured.”  Geographically Descriptive Trademark, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1631 (9th Ed. 2009) (emphasis 
added); see also 2 McCarthy on Trademarks 
§ 14:3 (providing examples of “geographically descriptive 
term[s]”).  When Congress used the term “geographic origin,” 
it was not writing on a blank slate, but instead appears to have 
intended to link the protections of the false advertising 
provision to a well-defined and readily understood concept: 
the place where the goods come from.14  Cf. Forschner Grp., 
                                              
14 To be clear, we are not opining that a mark must be 
a “geographically distinctive trademark” before a 
manufacturer may be found liable for falsely advertising the 
geographic origin of its goods.  The Second Circuit appears to 
have reached that conclusion, see Forschner Grp., 30 F.3d at 
353 (“Questions of false designation of geographic origin are 
properly considered within the analytical framework used to 
gauge the distinctiveness of trademarks.”), but whether 
“geographic origin” in § 1125(a)(1)(B) is a term of art 
incorporated in full from the common law of trademark 
protection was not briefed by the parties and we need not 
resolve that question today. We only hold that the term 
“geographic origin” must refer, at the very least, to the place 
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30 F.3d at 354 (concluding that “[u]nder the false advertising 
provision of the Lanham Act, a phrase is eligible for 
protection as a representation of geographic origin only if the 
phrase is geographically descriptive”).   
 
The name PARK’S FINEST says nothing about the 
product’s “geographic origin.”  In the end, Parks has not 
made a valid claim for false advertising because none of its 
grievances concern the “nature, characteristics, qualities, or 
geographic origin” of PARK’S FINEST.15 
 
B.  False Association 
 
 The elements of a false association trademark claim 
under the Lanham Act track the elements of a common law 
trademark infringement claim: a plaintiff must prove that “(1) 
the marks are valid and legally protectable; (2) the marks are 
owned by the plaintiff; and (3) the defendant’s use of the 
marks to identify goods or services is likely to create 
confusion concerning the origin of the goods or services.”  
Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prod., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 
291 (3d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Even 
when those elements are satisfied, relief is limited in scope to 
                                                                                                     
of the origin of goods and that PARK’S FINEST does not 
meet that requirement.   
 
15 The District Court also concluded that PARK’S 
FINEST did not have a “tendency to deceive a substantial 
portion of the intended audience.”  Parks, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 
417 (relying on Pernod Ricard, 653 F.3d at 248).  Because 
we conclude that Parks’s claims are not false advertising 
claims, there is no necessity to address that conclusion.   
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where “market penetration is significant enough to pose the 
real likelihood of confusion among the consumers in that 
area.”  Charles Jacquin Et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, 
Inc., 921 F.2d 467, 472 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
A valid and legally protectable mark must be 
“distinctive,” which may be shown in two ways.  Some marks 
are, by their very nature, considered distinctive.  2 McCarthy 
on Trademarks § 11:2.  Such inherently distinctive marks 
include ones that are arbitrary or fanciful, such as APPLE for 
computers or SHELL for gasoline, id. at § 11:11, as well as 
ones that are suggestive of a product’s function but not 
descriptive such as PENGUIN for freezers or SAMSON for 
weight training machines, id. at § 11:67.  On the other hand, 
marks that are merely descriptive of the product are not 
inherently distinctive and secondary meaning must be proven 
before such a name will be protectable.16  Id. at 11:2; see 
Commerce Nat’l. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Commerce Ins. Agency, 
Inc., 214 F.3d 432, 438 (3d Cir. 2000) (“If the mark has not 
been federally registered … then validity depends on proof of 
secondary meaning, unless the unregistered or contestable 
mark is inherently distinctive.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  The District Court concluded that PARKS was not 
inherently distinctive and had not achieved secondary 
meaning.  We agree.   
 
                                              
16 Wholly generic names cannot have trademark 
significance, 2 McCarthy on Trademarks § 12:1, but 
genericity is not at issue in this case. 
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 1.  Lack of Secondary Meaning 
 
Trademarks based on the surname of a founder are not 
inherently distinctive.  Doeblers’ Pennsylvania Hybrids, Inc. 
v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 827 n.17 (3d Cir. 2006), as 
amended (May 5, 2006).  In a painful stretch, Parks argues 
inherent distinctiveness should be a jury question because, 
even though its mark is, in fact, the surname of the company’s 
founder, the word “parks” is also the plural of “park,” as in 
recreational land, and therefore could be seen as an 
“arbitrary” mark.  But it is undisputed that Parks was named 
after its founder, someone who Parks describes with 
justifiable pride as “an important figure in the history of 
American Business,” (App. at 60) and Parks’s reputation is 
closely linked to its founder.17  Based on that record, no 
reasonable juror could conclude that the name PARKS was 
anything other than a reference to the founder.  It is obvious 
that the mark is not inherently distinctive.  
 
Parks was therefore required to demonstrate that the 
mark had secondary meaning at the time that Tyson began to 
use the name PARK’S FINEST.  As noted earlier, 
“[s]econdary meaning exists when the mark ‘is interpreted by 
the consuming public to be not only an identification of the 
product or services, but also a representation of the origin of 
those products or services.’”  Commerce Nat’l., 214 F.3d at 
438 (quoting Scott Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 
F.2d 1225, 1228 (3d Cir. 1978), superseded on other grounds 
by statute, Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), as recognized in Shire US 
Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 329 F.3d 348, 352 n.10 (3d Cir. 
                                              
17 Indeed, before its bankruptcy and acquisition, the 
name of the Parks Sausage Company was H.G. Parks, Inc.  
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2003)).  In assessing secondary meaning, we have relied on 
the following factors, to the extent relevant: 
 
(1) the extent of sales and advertising leading to 
buyer association; (2) length of use; (3) 
exclusivity of use; (4) the fact of copying; (5) 
customer surveys; (6) customer testimony; (7) 
the use of the mark in trade journals; (8) the size 
of the company; (9) the number of sales; (10) 
the number of customers; and, (11) actual 
confusion.  
Id. (citing Ford Motor Co., 930 F.2d at 292). 
 
As did the District Court, we consider each of the 
factors relevant to this case and conclude that no reasonable 
juror could decide that PARKS enjoyed secondary meaning at 
the time of the alleged infringement.18   
 
i.  Extent of Advertising 
 
Secondary meaning is generally “established through 
extensive advertising which creates in the minds of 
consumers an association between the mark and the provider 
of the [products or] services advertised under the mark.”  Id.  
Use of a mark “for a long period of time in a prevalent 
advertising campaign” can “create a reasonable inference” of 
                                              
18 There is no evidence in the record concerning 
customer testimony or the use of the mark in trade journals, 
so factors (6) and (7) of the Commerce National list are not 
relevant.  
 
 22 
secondary meaning.  E.T. Browne Drug Co., 538 F.3d at 200.  
Since approximately 2001, PARKS has not been advertised 
directly to consumers aside from around $14,000 a year that 
Dietz & Watson has spent on circular advertisements and in-
store product demonstrations.  Super Bakery has primarily 
engaged in direct marketing to “institutions and military 
facilities.”  Parks, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 422.  Decades ago, in 
the 1960s and ‘70s, PARKS had employed a ubiquitous and 
long-running ad campaign to reach consumers, and while 
there may still be some faint echoes of the campaign in the 
minds of some people, there is no evidence of recent 
“extensive advertising” such as would create the necessary 
mental association between the mark and the product.  
Commerce Nat’l., 214 F.3d at 438.  This factor thus cuts 
against a finding of secondary meaning.  
 
ii.  Length and Exclusivity of Use 
 
The “length of use” factor favors Parks, as its mark has 
been in continuous use for more than 50 years.  Additionally, 
Parks has used or licensed the mark exclusively throughout 
the entirety of the company’s existence.  And, of course, the 
fact that PARKS was once on the Principal Register at the 
USPTO indicates that PARKS had acquired secondary 
meaning once upon a time.  Cf. 2 McCarthy on Trademarks 
§ 15:32 (describing how registration creates a presumption of 
secondary meaning).  But consumer perceptions have a half-
life, and “once a mark, always a mark” has never been a 
principle of trademark law.  Merely proving length and 
exclusivity of use does not prove widespread familiarity.  As 
the District Court noted, “Parks has not cited to any evidence 
to attempt to quantify how widespread the name was known 
over those years before the present owners purchased the 
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company out of bankruptcy in the late 1990s[.]”  Parks, 186 
F. Supp. 3d at 426.  So while the length and exclusivity of use 
unquestionably favor Parks, those factors alone cannot carry 
the day.  
 
iii.  Evidence of Copying 
 
 Parks contends that Tyson copied the PARKS mark 
when it chose the name PARK’S FINEST.  But Parks’s only 
evidence of copying is a bare inference from the fact that 
Parks and Tyson compete in a similar space and that Tyson, 
upon a trademark search, found the lapsed PARKS mark.  On 
the other hand, Tyson submitted extensive focus group and 
survey data that showed how the name PARK’S FINEST was 
selected without any reference to PARKS.  Tyson emphasized 
that the name PARK’S FINEST was a finalist for the new 
brand name even before the trademark search was conducted.  
While on summary judgment the nonmoving party is entitled 
to reasonable inferences, it would be unreasonable on this 
record to conclude that Tyson copied PARKS.  Even the most 
generous weighing of this factor for Parks leaves it neutral. 
 
iv.  Customer Surveys 
 
 Parks conducted a survey that is used primarily to test 
for consumer confusion, but it then sought to use that same 
survey to also prove secondary meaning.  The attempt to 
make the survey do double duty was unwise.  
 
There are two predominant formats of consumer 
surveys used in trademark litigation to show a likelihood of 
confusion.  The first, the Ever-Ready survey, named after the 
case of Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 
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366, 385-88 (7th Cir. 1976), superseded on other grounds by 
statute, Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), as recognized in Scandia Down 
Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985), 
involves showing consumers only the potentially-infringing 
product and asking open-ended questions to determine 
whether they believe the product is associated with the senior 
mark.  See Jerre B. Swann, Likelihood of Confusion Studies 
and the Straitened Scope of Squirt, 98 Trademark Rep. 739, 
746 (2008) (describing the Ever-Ready format as the “gold 
standard” for likelihood of confusion surveys).  Even though 
that survey design is most helpful for illustrating a likelihood 
of confusion, it can also indicate secondary meaning by 
showing a high degree of familiarity with the senior mark.  Id. 
at 745 (“The [Ever-Ready] format … addresses … brand 
strength.” (emphasis added)). 
 
An Ever-Ready survey is usually employed by owners 
of commercially strong marks.  Id. at 739.  Holders of weaker 
marks more frequently employ a Squirt survey, named after 
the type used in SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 
1089 n.4 (8th Cir. 1980).  Parks’s expert, Mark Lang, chose 
to use a Squirt survey because of what he described as “the 
relatively weak commercial strength of the [PARKS] 
brand[.]”  (App. at 658-59.)  He also said that a Squirt survey 
was appropriate because PARKS and PARK’S FINEST 
“have a high degree of proximity in the marketplace[.]”  
(App. at 659.)  In a Squirt survey, two products are placed 
side by side, often with other products that serve as controls, 
and participants are asked questions to determine if confusion 
exists as to the source of the products.19  Swann, 98 
                                              
19 Lang surveyed 893 individuals for Parks.  
Participants were assigned randomly to one of four groups: 
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Trademark Rep. at 749-50.  Courts have sometimes criticized 
Squirt surveys for utilizing closed-ended questions that can 
lead participants to the desired answer.  See Scott Fetzer Co. 
v. House of Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 487-88 (5th Cir. 
2004) (critiquing a Squirt survey for pushing “survey 
participants to search for any connection, no matter how 
attenuated ... instead of permitting participants to make their 
own associations”); Riviana Foods Inc. v. Societe Des 
Produits Nestle S.A., Civ. A. No. H-93-2176, 1994 WL 
761242, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 1994) (rejecting a Squirt 
survey because it “used a leading question on the likelihood 
of confusion issue”); see also Swann, 98 Trademark Rep. at 
752-53 (compiling cases).  Nevertheless, a well-designed 
Squirt survey may show a likelihood of confusion.  What it 
                                                                                                     
two test groups and two control groups.  The test groups were 
shown an array of five hot dog or sausage products including 
PARKS, PARK’S FINEST and three other brands.  The 
control groups were shown PARKS sausages and an 
imaginary mark called BALL PARK OUR FINEST.  All four 
groups were asked an identical series of questions to gauge 
product confusion.  First, they were asked if “two or more” of 
the products were “from the same company or are affiliated 
or connected[.]”  (App. at 664.)  Then, those who said yes 
were asked to identify which two brands were affiliated and 
to explain why they felt the products were affiliated.   
 Of those in the test groups, 49.1% thought that two or 
more of the products were affiliated, while only 19.3% 
thought that in the control group.  Based on the answers to the 
follow-up questions, Lang concluded that around one in five 
hot dog or sausage consumers were likely to confuse PARKS 
and PARK’S FINEST.     
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does not do or even purport to do, however, is prove 
secondary meaning. 
 
 As the District Court perceived, there was a 
“fundamental[] flaw in the survey’s methodology,” if the 
point was to show secondary meaning.  Parks, 186 F. Supp. 
3d at 418.  Because the survey presented an image of both 
PARKS and PARK’S FINEST, a consumer who had never 
heard of PARKS could still conclude that the two products 
were affiliated.  Specifically, participants were shown two 
products with the words “Parks” or “Park’s” in the title and 
several other hot dog or sausage products with names bearing 
no obvious linguistic connection to Parks, and then asked 
whether any of the products were affiliated.  Given the 
products shown, PARKS and PARK’S FINEST were the 
obvious choices.  Cf. THOIP v. Walt Disney Co., 788 F. 
Supp. 2d 168, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting a Squirt survey 
in part because the allegedly infringing product “stood out 
like a bearded man in a lineup with four clean-shaven men” 
and therefore participants were pushed to reach a particular 
outcome (internal quotation omitted)).  Participants were 
therefore primed to reach that conclusion, even if they were 
not familiar with either PARKS or PARK’S FINEST as 
trademarks.20  Cf. Nat’l Distillers Prods. Co., LLC v. 
                                              
20 As the District Court noted, the survey might have 
shed light on secondary meaning if participants had been 
asked to identify the source of PARKS or PARK’S FINEST, 
but no such follow-up questions were asked.  Parks, 186 F. 
Supp. 3d at 425; see also Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy 
Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 82 (3d Cir. 1982) (relying on a 
consumer survey showing participants an imitation product 
and asking them to identify the manufacturer); E. I. DuPont 
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Refreshment Brands, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 474, 484 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (observing that a similar survey was flawed 
because “every respondent was exposed to the [allegedly 
infringed] product … thus acquainting them with a product 
that they would almost certainly have been unfamiliar with 
otherwise, due to [the product’s] very limited distribution 
network and weak sales”). 
 
As a result, while Lang’s survey may or may not have 
been useful for illustrating a likelihood of confusion,21 it was 
certainly not probative of whether PARKS had secondary 
meaning.  Rather, there were at least three equally plausible 
conclusions that a participant could have reached when 
responding that PARKS and PARK’S FINEST were 
associated: 1) that PARK’S FINEST came from Parks (the 
inference Parks obviously preferred); 2) that PARKS was 
made by Tyson as an extension of the BALL PARK mark; or 
3) that PARK’S FINEST and PARKS were both made by 
some unknown third party.  None of those inferences is more 
likely than the other, so the survey tells us nothing about 
whether the PARKS mark had achieved sufficient consumer 
                                                                                                     
de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 
520 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (involving a trademark dispute between 
the makers of TEFLON products and a zipper named 
EFLON, and highlighting a survey that established that 
TEFLON was “fairly well known” among prospective 
EFLON purchasers).  
 
21 Tyson raised a variety of methodological concerns 
with the survey that Parks employed.  Given our conclusion 
that the survey design is incapable of proving secondary 
meaning, we need not discuss those other flaws.  
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recognition to qualify as having secondary meaning.  Cf. 
Itamar Simonson, The Effect of Survey Method on Likelihood 
of Confusion Estimates: Conceptual Analysis and Empirical 
Test, 83 Trademark Rep. 364, 387 (1993) (noting that the 
“[Squirt] [f]ormat[] tend[s] to lead to relatively high 
confusion estimates when the senior and junior marks appear 
as logical extensions”).   
 
Parks nevertheless argues that “proof of one – 
likelihood of confusion – is proof of the other – secondary 
meaning.”  (Opening Br. at 35) (relying on Interpace Corp. v. 
Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 465 (3d Cir. 1983).)  That is simply 
wrong.  It is true that evidence proving secondary meaning 
and evidence proving likelihood of confusion may sometimes 
overlap.  But not always.  See 2 McCarthy on Trademarks 
§ 15:11 n.1 (“Not every response rate that shows likely 
confusion establishes secondary meaning and not every 
survey that fails to show likely confusion establishes an 
absence of secondary meaning.” (quoting Vincent N. 
Palladino, Secondary Meaning Surveys, in TRADEMARK AND 
DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING SURVEYS: LAW, LAW SCIENCE, 
AND DESIGN 98 (2012))).  Two marks can be confusingly 
similar even if neither has secondary meaning.  See Scott 
Paper, 589 F.2d at 1229 (noting that “[l]ikelihood of 
confusion is an analytically distinct” concept from secondary 
meaning). Consumers may find an association even if both 
marks were previously unknown to them.  Establishing that 
two marks are similar does not necessarily lead to any valid 
conclusion about whether either of the two has secondary 
meaning.  See Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 762 F. 
Supp. 772, 779 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (“However proper the survey 
question may have been to prove likelihood of confusion 
between the marks, it was improper to prove secondary 
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meaning.”), aff’d, 975 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1992); Spraying Sys. 
Co., v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 394 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(noting that a leading survey design “created a bias in favor of 
identifying a single company” as the source of the products 
and therefore the survey results could not prove secondary 
meaning).  The “customer survey” factor, Commerce Nat’l., 
214 F.3d at 438, thus favors neither Parks nor Tyson. 
 
v.  Size of the Company and Number 
  of Sales and Customers 
 
 The size of a company, its total sales, and the size of 
its customer base can also be probative of secondary meaning 
because the jury is entitled to draw the logical inference that 
“[t]he larger a company and the greater its sales, the greater 
the number of people who have been exposed to [the] symbol 
used as a trademark, and the greater the number of people 
who may associate [that] symbol with a company or source 
with which they should be familiarized.”  2 McCarthy on 
Trademarks § 15:49.  But “[r]aw sales figures need to be put 
into context to have any meaning.”  Id.  When put into 
context, the sales figures for PARKS are not probative of 
secondary meaning.  Since 2011, sales of PARKS sausages 
accounted for no more than 1.3% of the breakfast sausage 
market in the northeast and 0.01% of the market in the mid-
south in any given year.22  Dinner sausage sales made up less 
                                              
22 The District Court relied on Tyson’s data with 
regard to the market share of PARKS products in various 
regions of the country, because Parks did not provide a 
detailed breakdown of sales. Tyson’s expert relied on data 
provided by IRI, a data analytics company.  In the IRI dataset, 
the “northeast” was defined as including Pennsylvania, New 
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than 1% of the sales in the northeast and less than 0.5% of the 
sales in the mid-south.  Sales figures outside of those regions 
were even less significant.  None of the sales numbers are 
large enough to indicate secondary meaning.  
 
Sales in Pennsylvania and New Jersey were 
considerably greater than sales in other states, so “[i]t is 
possible that sales in  … th[o]se states … could be large 
enough, relative to the market in those states, to be probative 
of secondary meaning in those markets.”  Parks, 186 F. Supp. 
3d at 424 n.12.  Parks, however, made the expansive and 
ultimately unfounded claim that its PARKS mark had 
secondary meaning throughout the whole eastern United 
States,23 and it failed to break down data on market share by 
state.  So, at most, Parks’s sales data might weakly support a 
finding that the PARKS mark has secondary meaning in one 
portion of the northeast, but it does not support the broader 
claim that Parks made in its complaint.   
                                                                                                     
Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine, and the “mid-south” 
as Maryland, West Virginia, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, 
and North Carolina.  On appeal, Parks does not question the 
District Court’s reliance on the IRI data or the categorization 
of various regions of the country, and so we likewise rely on 
Tyson’s data. 
 
23 The District Court noted that Parks failed to define 
“[e]astern United States” but concluded, based on Parks’s 
pleadings, that the term encompassed “all states east of the 
Mississippi River.”  Parks, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 421 n.8 
(quoting Parks’s brief).  Parks has not contested that 
conclusion. 
 31 
 
vi.  Actual Confusion  
 
 The evidence that Parks put forth of actual confusion 
was similarly unimpressive After extensive discovery, the 
company could only produce two declarations from 
employees of Dietz & Watson and Super Bakery.  The first 
declaration came from an employee at Dietz & Watson with 
some responsibility for PARKS-branded products.  He 
recounted three instances of consumer confusion: one 
consumer contacted Parks to complain about “[PARKS] from 
BALL PARK,” and two consumers called Parks to complain 
about the nitrate content of its sausages – presumably because 
PARK’S FINEST prominently advertises that it is free of 
nitrates.  Parks, 2015 WL 4545408 at *6.  The second 
declaration came from a manager at Super Bakery who 
recalled his own personal confusion when he first 
encountered the PARK’S FINEST product.  Id.   
 
Such declarations from friendly sources are potentially 
“self-serving and of little probative value.”  815 Tonawanda 
St. Corp. v. Fay’s Drug Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 643, 648 (2d Cir. 
1988).  More importantly, though, PARK’S FINEST has sold 
“many millions of units,” Parks, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 426 
(internal quotation marks omitted), and one would expect to 
see more than a handful of vague complaints of confusion.  If 
anything, the paucity of proof of actual confusion suggests 
that the PARKS mark lacks secondary meaning.  As we have 
said before, “harmonious coexistence in the same 
geographical area … cuts against [a] claim to secondary 
meaning.”  Commerce Nat’l., 214 F.3d at 440. 
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viii.  Conclusion with Regard to  
    Secondary Meaning  
 
 At the end of the day, the fact that the PARKS mark 
has existed for a long time and that it enjoyed secondary 
meaning half a century ago cannot overcome the weight of 
the factors against Parks.  The record shows that there is 
almost no direct-to-consumer advertising, that Parks had a 
miniscule market share, and that there was practically no 
record of actual confusion.24  To find secondary meaning, 
                                              
24 Although the lack of secondary meaning would itself 
be a sufficient basis for affirming the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment, Tyson’s alternative argument that there is 
insufficient evidence of “market penetration” is persuasive.  
(Ans. Br. at 41.)  “[T]he trademark of a prior user should be 
protected from infringement by a subsequent user of the same 
mark only in areas where the prior user has established a 
market for its goods[.]”  Nat. Footwear Ltd. v. Hart, 
Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1394 (3d Cir. 1985); see 
also Charles Jacquin Et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 
921 F.2d 467, 473-74 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying Nat. Footwear 
to the secondary meaning context).  To determine market 
penetration, we consider  
 
(1) the volume of sales of the 
trademarked product; (2) the growth trends 
(both positive and negative) in the area; (3) the 
number of persons actually purchasing the 
product in relation to the potential number of 
customers; and (4) the amount of product 
advertising in the area.  
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jurors would have to make an impermissible “leap of faith[.]”  
Parks, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 426 (quoting E.T. Browne Drug 
Co., 538 F.3d at 199).  Accordingly, the District Court 
correctly concluded that no reasonable jury could find that the 
PARKS mark had secondary meaning. 25     
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order granting summary judgment to Tyson on 
Parks’s claims.   
                                                                                                     
Nat. Footwear Ltd., 760 F.2d at 1398-99 (footnotes 
omitted).   
For many of the same reasons that we conclude that 
the PARKS mark does not enjoy secondary meaning 
throughout the eastern United States, we also conclude that it 
lacked adequate market penetration.  In particular, Parks 
sought to enjoin Tyson from selling in at least five states 
where there is no evidence of sales at all.  And sales in many 
states outside of the northeast are extremely limited if not “de 
minimis,” id. at 1400.   
 
25 Because we conclude that PARKS does not have 
secondary meaning, we do not need to consider whether 
Parks offered sufficient proof of a likelihood of confusion.  
Likewise, we do not address Tyson’s affirmative defense of 
abandonment through uncontrolled licensing.   
 
